There were four main salt-producing areas (GH-8) in the Indian Subcontinent – the coastal belts of Orissa and the Rann of Kutch for harvesting salt from the sea, the Mandi district of Himachal Pradesh, and the Salt Range extending across the Indus towards Kohat for rock salt. When the East India Company gained control of Bengal and Oudh, trading in salt from Orissa became a monopoly of the senior officers of the company who secured contracts to deliver salt to depots. Such depots were the only way the merchants had to buy salt legally and administrators like Clive (GH- 9) and others made fortunes. When it became a scandal of such immense proportions that it was being questioned in the parliament in the UK, the Company revamped the system twice between 1767 and 1780. It divided the infrastructure into agencies, each under the control of an agent and governed by a controller. Within three years, the revenue from salt rose from Rs. 80,000 to over Rs. 6 million (insert in GH-9) which gives an idea of how much money was being shoveled into the private coffers of the officials of the company. However, to further increase its revenue, the company not only sold the salt at high wholesale prices but also taxed it.
There is no limit to greed but it has its consequences. The high price of salt which now few could afford, led to increased smuggling, and at the turn of the century, the Company was forced to establish a series of custom posts along the southern boundaries of the Bengal Presidency (GH- 10) which proved to be ineffective. A more effective line developed from a series of custom posts that were installed along the boundaries of the States of Rajputana (insert highlight). in 1823 by the Commissioner of Customs for Agra and a secondary line extended from Allahabad to Nepal (insert highlight).
The Custom Line conformed to the boundaries of the Company rule as it extended westward. G. H. Smith, who had become Commissioner of Customs in 1834 was provided the resources of men and money for taking the line southwest along the Sutlej and the boundaries of the Bahawalpur State till Panjnad and then cutting west to the Indus at Mithankot (insert highlight). Posts were established at intervals of one mile along a raised path with gates every four miles, manned by a Jemadar and ten men. The aim was to prevent the sources of supply of salt from the Rann from entering the new British provinces through the native states of Rajasthan and Bahawalpur (indicate by arrows). In 1843 it was officially named the Inland Customs Line and each section was given a designation e.g. the length of the barrier along the border of the Bahawalpur State was the Sutlej Customs Line, and that along the Indus as the Indus Preventive Line.
West of the River Indus pure salt of good flavor was harvested from a stratum that lay exposed within the hills and only required grinding. However, it was denied to the population of the Punjab by the Indus Preventive Line that stretched some 325 miles long from Layyah to Tarbela (indicate) and was policed by the Department of Salt Revenue in Northern India until at least 1895. Cis-Indus were the salt mines at Kalabagh (GH-11) and Kwera (GH-12) in the Salt Range producing high-grade salt and subject to heavy tax. During the Sikh rule, the revenue from the Kwera mines went into the coffers of Gulab Singh (GH-13), the Raja of Jammu, and on annexing Punjab, it came under the control of British India customs.
During the 20 years that G. H. Smith was Commissioner of Customs, the line extended 4,000 km and was guarded by a force of between 12,000 to 14,000 manning 1,727 customs posts. (GH-13A. IMAGE OF BELT BUCKLE). A similar line drawn through Europe would have joined the southern shores of Spain with Moscow (GH-14). Portions of it were fortified with thorn bushes, mainly the dwarf Indian plum, but to limited effect. It was during Smith’s tenure that the events of 1857 occurred (GH-14A). While there were many causes for the Great Revolt one of them was economic grievances such as land taxation and the salt tax. Unfortunately, the British Crown which replaced the East India Company took steps to make the Custom Line a continuous and effective barrier.
Allan Octavian Hume (GH-15), who was the commissioner from 1867-70, and a botanist realized that it would be much more economical to develop it into a barrier of live plants. After experimenting, along with the Indian plum (GH-17), he planted the babool (GH-18), bamboo, beri, and karonda, and where nothing else grew the prickly pear (GH-19). Poor soil was replaced and irrigation was provided from wells. The scale of effort can be judged from the fact that in 1869 alone, 2 million cubic feet of earth was dug and over 150,000 tons of thorny material was transported for the hedge. By the end of his tenure, Hume proudly reported that he had 448 miles (725 km) of “perfect hedge”, at least eight feet high and four feet thick. Where the land was too barren to grow plants, Hume’s successor extended the barrier with ditches and stone walls.
For all that work, like any barrier, the hedge was only partially successful. Dust storms (GH-21) sweeping across the plains at a velocity of over 100 km flattened or swept away the hedge. The excellent illustration by Nigel Susman shows the hazards faced by the hedge. (GH-21A) Whole sections were destroyed by white ants (deemak) and by fires set off deliberately or otherwise. in its path. Locusts and parasitic vines damaged the foliage and rats and other vermin burrowed in and killed the roots. Smugglers exploited gaps where no plants could grow, crossed over by climbing the trees, or just threw sacks of salt to their accomplices on the other side. Gangs forced their way through the hedge with herds of salt-laden camels or cattle.
Why did the Raj divert so much effort and resources into developing the Inland Customs Line? For two reasons. Firstly, because 10 percent of its revenue came from the salt tax; and secondly, it supported the UK’s Salt mines. Cheshire salt (GH-22) imported from the UK was of inferior quality but was sold at a much cheaper rate. Though India could be the largest salt producer in the world, by 1851 thanks to the collusion between the East India Company and the British Government, over 2.58 million metric tons a year were being imported from the UK. The greatest damage caused by the high price of salt was that it led to salt deprivation in millions of Indians living across the Hedge. In regions with higher prices, people consumed less than half of what the average person took west of the line. Salt deprivation might have contributed to many diseases worsening health and hindering recoveries. During Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow (GH-23), thousands of his troops suffering from salt deficiency died due to inadequate wound healing and lowered disease resistance. The degree to which the population in India craved salt is indicated by the fact that after the Inland Customs Line was abolished, by 1888 salt consumption in India had increased by 50 percent, and by 1911 it had doubled.
By the 1870s, the hedge had become a nuisance. Lord Mayo (GH-24), who was the Viceroy from 1869 to 1872, took the first steps towards abolition of the line. His successor Lord Northbrook, (GH-25) pursued the matter and in 1873 asked Batten, the Commissioner of Inland Revenue to submit a confidential note on the Inland Custom Line. The concluding paragraph of the 14-page note summarizes his thoughts. (GH-26)
“There is no doubt that if the different salt sources were in British Territory, we should put an excise duty on the salt at the production places instead of letting it escape free to be caught again hundreds of miles away by an enormous Custom barrier. Does the fact that many of these sources are in the limits of our Native Feudatories raise an insurmountable obstacle to our levying the salt duty by a rational and economical method instead of by the expensive and semi-barbarous contrivance of an army of preventive officers posted along a line several hundreds of miles in length passing through the heat of a peaceable country the of which is subject to one paramount power?”
Sir John Strachey (GH-27}, the then finance minister and a lifelong civil servant in British India was a strong advocate of free trade and was vehemently against the Custom Line. He also voiced a similar opinion and referred to the Inland Custom Line as “a monstrous system,” that had few parallels “in any tolerably civilized country.” It also needed a great deal of effort to erect and maintain. Each mile required 250 tons of thorny brushwood and other organic material to create, and in one year the patrols might carry 100,000 tons of this plant matter to shore up stretches of dry hedges.
In 1875, under treaties with the concerned Native States, the Government acquired the sources of Salt production including Sambhar Lake (GH-27A), the largest saline lake in India. A year later they began to remove inland duties and by 1878, duties were equalized in most of India. Consequently, it became uneconomical to smuggle salt, sugar, and other goods and the whole Custom Line and Hedge became redundant. However, a portion along the Indus was retained to prevent the smuggling of the still lightly taxed Kohat salt.
Simultaneously, the production of salt increased, and by 1901, imports of UK salt had declined by 50 percent. But the salt tax remained and in 1930, Gandhi decided to make it a political issue. This culminated in the Salt March and violent demonstrations during which over 60,000 including Gandhi were arrested.
In 1995, Moxham who authored A Brief History of Tea, purchased a used book in which an official of British India mentioned a custom hedge. This triggered a 2-year quest for a forgotten piece of colonial history that took Moxham right through Central India and ultimately transformed into a book ‘The Great Hedge of India’. In most places, no one knew it had ever existed but he finally met someone who took Moxham to a site where part of it still existed. Here Moxham saw, “Clusters of thorny acacias topped the embankment. Some were 20 feet high. Thorn-covered Indian plum trees barred the way .… We had found it at last.” That was all that remained of what a century earlier Sir John Strachey, the finance minister had referred to as “a monstrous system,” that had few parallels “in any tolerably civilized country.”
